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DELEGATING TAX
James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue*
Congress delegates extensive and growing lawmaking authority to federal administrative agencies in areas other than taxation, but tightly limits the scope
of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury regulatory discretion in the
tax area, specifically not permitting these agencies to select or adjust tax rates.
This Article questions why tax policy does and should differ from other policy
areas in this respect, noting some of the potential policy benefits of delegation.
Greater delegation of tax lawmaking authority would allow administrative
agencies to apply their expertise to fiscal policy and afford timely adjustment
to changing economic circumstances. Furthermore, delegation of the tax reform process to an independent commission or agency offers the prospect of
Congress committing itself to rational reform and long-run budget sustainability in a way that is more apt to succeed than piecemeal legislative
efforts. The Article concludes with an analysis of the constitutionality of tax
delegation, noting the applicability of recent Supreme Court decisions confirming Congress’s broad discretion to delegate rulemaking authority to federal agencies, and arguing that tax policy is of a kind with other federal
policies.

“Congressional delegation of broad lawmaking power to administrative
agencies has defined the modern regulatory state.”
—David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff1
“Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress . . . is the sole organ for levying
taxes . . . .”
—Justice William O. Douglas2
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Introduction
The broad delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies is
a well-accepted feature of modern U.S. policymaking.3 Administrative agencies with vast lawmaking powers now oversee virtually every sector of the
U.S. economy. The National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) regulates not only the automobiles that Americans drive, but also
the roads on which those cars are driven.4 Congress has given the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) broad lawmaking power with respect to the
food Americans eat and the drugs Americans take, both legal and illegal.5
Imbued with extraordinary powers, the federal Environmental Protection
Agency regulates the air and water.6 The legislative branch has even delegated important aspects of the healthcare system to a regulatory body. For
example, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Congress recently empowered the Secretary of Health and Human Services, with
the assistance of a new Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), to
make recommendations for cutting Medicare expenditures that will automatically become law unless a congressional supermajority rejects the proposals.7 One could continue at great length, listing examples to illustrate the
point that Congress regularly delegates enormous amounts of lawmaking
power,8 from control over the money supply (power delegated to the Federal
3. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 266 (classifying the “delegation of broad lawmaking power to administrative agencies” as a “now-foundational governmental practice”); F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-Redelegation Doctrine, 55 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 163, 170 (2013) (“Congress frequently delegates its power and regularly confers on administrative agencies the power to develop policy through rulemaking.”); Richard B. Stewart,
Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323, 329 (1987) (noting the “massive transfer”
of policymaking to federal administrative agencies).
4. See 23 U.S.C. § 402 (2012); Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat.
1739 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 401–412).
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2012); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f).
6. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515 (2012); Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086.
7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3403(a), 124 Stat.
119, 499–500 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(e)); Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 Geo. L.J. 519, 569–71 (2013).
8. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 497 (1989) (noting that the “funneling [of] enormous
power into agencies” through regulatory statutes has “radically reconfigured . . . government
authority”); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 3, at 170.
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Reserve Board)9 to the process for closing military bases after the end of the
Cold War (which Congress entrusted to the Base Closure and Realignment
Commission).10
But what about tax law? In the same way that Congress has delegated
lawmaking power in these other areas, has it done so with tax? The answer is
yes—and no. Congress has obviously delegated a great deal of tax lawmaking authority to the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). This is evidenced by, if nothing else, the thousands of pages of Treasury regulations, the numerous revenue rulings and other forms of written
guidance issued by the IRS, and the countless discretionary enforcement decisions made by the IRS every year—settling some tax cases, litigating
others.11 Congress has also delegated some tax decisionmaking authority to
the U.S. Tax Court, which interprets tax laws and regulations when taxpayers
bring disputes over IRS determinations of tax deficiencies.12
These examples of agency-based tax lawmaking, however, differ from
the sort of broad policymaking discretion that Congress regularly delegates
to agencies in other areas of law. For example, Congress rarely enacts tax
statutes that set out broad tax policy principles and authorize the Treasury
Department or some other regulatory agency to fill in the details. There is
no tax equivalent, for example, to the language in the Clean Air Act empowering (and requiring) the EPA administrator to set emissions standards for
“any air pollutant . . . which in his judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.”13 Moreover, there is at least some scholarly support for our
claim that Congress generally delegates less broadly in the tax area than in
other areas. In their study of all federal legislation between 1947 and 1992,
Professors Epstein and O’Halloran find that tax legislation granted less policy and implementation discretion to executive agencies than did laws passed
by Congress in any of fifty-three other substantive federal policy areas.14
9. 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2012); id. §§ 411, 414.
10. 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2012); Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808.
11. 1 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2012 Annual Report to Congress 6 (2012), http://
www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/Full-Report/Volume-1.pdf (estimating that the Internal Revenue Code contains four million words); 1 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2008 Annual Report to Congress 4 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_msp_1.pdf
(noting that the number of words in the Code as of 2005 was estimated at 2.1 million, that tax
regulations stand approximately a foot tall and that “[t]he CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter
. . . comprises 25 volumes . . . tak[ing] up nine feet of shelf space”).
12. I.R.C. § 7441 (2012).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). The closest tax law analogs to a broad delegation of
lawmaking authority would be IRC § 482, which addresses the allocation of income among
related parties, and § 1502, which addresses consolidated tax returns by related parties. We
discuss these examples further below.
14. David Epstein &SC Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers 196–203 tbl.8.2
(1999). This study measures delegation by identifying the fraction of legislative provisions with
significant authority delegated to executive agencies, and also identifying the extent of legislated constraints on agency discretion. The difference between the two is the net delegation
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This Article suggests that Congress should consider more extensively
delegating authority in the tax area—or, at the very least, that Congress
should think more expansively about what types of tax lawmaking power it
is prepared to delegate. In this Article, as in most scholarship on congressional delegation, it is said that Congress “delegates” lawmaking authority
when it enacts a statute that grants lawmaking power to an administrative
agency or some other nonlegislative body. In other words, agencies exercise
delegated authority postenactment. It is routine, of course, for Congress to
rely heavily on its own staff, the Congressional Budget Office, the Council of
Economic Advisers, and other important federal policy agencies (including
Treasury and the IRS) for help conceiving and drafting legislation in the first
instance. Those inputs are doubtless important to the lawmaking process;
however, that sort of pre-enactment assistance is not what we, and not what
others who write about regulatory agencies, mean by delegation. Thus, a
move in the direction of greater delegation by Congress in a particular field
of law implies that Congress has granted greater decisionmaking authority
to parties whose actions will take place after the delegating legislation is
enacted.
Another point worth emphasizing here is that greater tax delegation
does not necessarily mean granting the Treasury Department greater authority. As discussed further below, what we have in mind is taking regulatory
authority that Congress currently implements (in the minutiae) through the
tax code and delegating more of that authority to some expert, and in some
instances a politically independent, regulatory body.
Moreover, just because we seek to encourage consideration of greater
delegation in the tax area does not mean that, in our view, Congress should
replace the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) with a general standard, a single
sentence that reads as follows: “The Department of Treasury shall promulgate all tax rules necessary to raise revenue sufficient to balance the federal
budget and shall do so in a manner that is fair and efficient.” Even if such an
extreme delegation were desirable and constitutional (more on the latter
question below), it is not a realistic possibility. Nevertheless, a number of
considerably less extreme tax-delegation alternatives are within the realm of
possibility but have never been used, or, so far as we are aware, seriously
considered. This Article identifies three distinct types of tax delegation that
have never before been used but are worthy of consideration, each for a

ratio. The authors use a number of different methods for identifying types or categories of
legislation, including methods developed by other scholars. For example, they use the categories developed in David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking,
and Investigations, 1946-1990 (1991) as well as the alternative categorization developed in
Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Workshop, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 357 (1985). Under all of the various approaches to classifying federal
statutes, tax law placed at or near the bottom in terms of the amount of discretion that has
been delegated to agency decisionmaking. The difference was especially stark for laws setting
tax rates, which entailed the smallest amount of discretion-granting of any type of federal
legislation by far.
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somewhat different constellation of reasons and each subject to a different
set of objections and qualifications.
First, when Congress wants to enact a tax subsidy for a particular type
of investment or activity, it should consider doing so in the form of a general tax standard rather than in the form of a set of ornately detailed tax
rules. The standard would provide the Treasury Department with a relatively
general statement of the policy goals to pursue, empowering Treasury to
issue rules to meet those goals and to change those rules as necessary to
continue to meet them. The rationale for such a shift would be the standard
relative-expertise or comparative-advantage story often used to justify broad
delegations of regulatory authority in nontax contexts. As explained below,
Congress already does some of this, but it could do more.
Second, and more controversially, Congress should consider delegating
some control over income tax rates, which would be unprecedented in U.S.
history. Such authority could be granted to the Treasury Department, or,
perhaps more realistically, to some other, arguably more independent,
agency such as the Federal Reserve or a newly created independent authority. Giving the Federal Reserve some control over income tax rates would
allow it to coordinate fiscal policy with existing monetary policy in the hope
of dampening business cycles. Moreover, the Fed or some other independent
agency might be able to precommit to an optimal policy plan over time,
which Congress notoriously struggles to do.
Third, in designing the tax system efficiently and fairly to promote longrun fiscal sustainability—a goal that has eluded Congress for decades—the
legislative body should consider delegating the tax reform component of a
long-run deficit-closure effort to an independent commission similar to the
Base Realignment and Closure model.15 The rationale for this move has to
do with collective action problems that inhibit the legislative branch from
taking action, even in the face of strong evidence that such action is social
welfare-maximizing.
In addition, it should be noted that Congress could delegate in any or all
of these ways while still retaining a considerable degree of control over the
one aspect of tax lawmaking that many regard as quintessentially legislative
in character: namely, distributional consequences. Lawmakers and voters
may consider it important for Congress to determine as much as possible
the ultimate distribution of the federal tax burden across taxpayers. In that
case, Congress could attach a requirement to any or all of these new forms of
tax delegation that any policymaking output by the agency must be accompanied by a particular distribution of the tax burden designated in advance
by, and remaining fully within the control of, Congress. We discuss this
possibility further below.
Whether the sorts of broader tax delegations that this Article envisions
are constitutional is obviously a separate but related question, and one that
has been largely unexamined. On one hand, in areas other than tax, most
15. Indeed, a colleague suggested that such a law might be called the Tax Base Realignment and Loophole Closure Act.
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scholars have concluded that few, if any, limits constrain Congress’s power
to delegate to administrative agencies. Indeed, much has been written in
recent decades about the demise of the so-called nondelegation doctrine as a
matter of constitutional law.16 This is no surprise, given that the Supreme
Court has not invalidated a federal law as an impermissible delegation of
congressional authority since 1935.17 In addition, in the intervening eighty
years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the congressional power
to delegate lawmaking authority is extremely broad, so long as the statutory
delegation includes an “intelligible principle” by which a court can evaluate
the agency’s exercise of its discretion.18 Moreover, the Court has stated its
view in prior tax nondelegation cases that when it comes to questions of
delegation, there is no difference between tax law and other areas of law.19
On the other hand, the Court has also made statements in opinions
issued over the years, including the second quote at the start of this Article,
suggesting that it regards tax as special. And the current Court—or important members of it—has made clear that tax legislation is different from
other types of legislation, and possibly holds similar views concerning tax
delegation.20 This Article argues that, when it comes to nondelegation and
16. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721 (2002) (asserting that although the Constitution bars the delegation of
legislative power, that bar is not implicated with a statutory grant of authority to the executive
branch or other agents because such agents are exercising executive, not legislative, powers); cf.
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87
Cornell L. Rev. 452 (2002) (arguing that courts should rely on the “hard look” doctrine of
administrative law to address the delegation issue, rather than the nondelegation doctrine
under constitutional law); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315,
315–16 (2000) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine has been “relocated” to certain interpretative canons of construction).
17. The most famous case was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935), in which the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act on the
ground, among others, that the Act’s statutory standards were so open-ended as to impose no
constraint whatsoever on agency action.
18. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the
agency. Article I, § 1, of the Constitution . . . permits no delegation of those powers, and so we
repeatedly have said that when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting J. W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (citations omitted)).
19. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55
(2011) (“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax
law only. To the contrary, we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))).
20. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (“[A]lthough the
breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its power to regulate commerce, the taxing
power does not give Congress the same degree of control over individual behavior. Once we
recognize that Congress may regulate a particular decision under the Commerce Clause, the
Federal Government can bring its full weight to bear. . . . By contrast, Congress’s authority
under the taxing power is limited to requiring an individual to pay money into the Federal
Treasury, no more.”).
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related constitutional doctrines, the Court should not impose special,
stricter limits on deliberate tax delegation undertaken by Congress. Tax laws,
at least in terms of delegation authority, should be treated the same as other
laws.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the general arguments for
and against general delegation of congressional authority to administrative
agencies. Part II describes several forms of existing tax delegation, pointing
out the relatively narrow role reserved for Treasury and the IRS compared
with the regulatory role given to other federal agencies. This Part also considers some arguments for why tax lawmaking differs from other types of
lawmaking. Part III then works through the three general types of expanded
tax delegation mentioned above, which, again, go beyond what has previously been done in the tax area but which have precedents in other areas.
Part IV addresses the constitutionality of these sorts of expanded tax
delegation.
I. Arguments for (and Against) Broad Delegation
One of the most remarked-on developments in American law, ever, is
the rise of the regulatory state.21 For many commentators, the delegation of
broad lawmaking authority and the increased role of regulatory agencies
were both inevitable and desirable developments given the increasing complexity of modern economies.22 One of the traditional rationales for broad
delegation is relative expertise, meaning that regulatory agencies have greater
knowledge and focus in particular areas and specific issues than Congress
does—or realistically can.23 An extreme example is the National Science
Foundation, to which Congress delegates the task of selecting which researchers will receive federal grants to do basic research.24 The NSF, staffed
and assisted by preeminent experts in many fields of scientific inquiry,25 has
21. See supra notes 4, 11. For surveys of the earlier political science literature on federal
delegation, see Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 14; Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer,
The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. Econ. Literature 401 (2003).
22. For representative justifications of broad congressional delegation of lawmaking
power to agencies, and thus of the regulatory state in general, see, for example, Jerry L.
Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law
(1997) [hereinafter Mashaw, Greed]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985) [hereinafter Mashaw, Prodelegation]; Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775 (1999); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (1992).
23. See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981);
James M. Landis, The Administrative Process (1938); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713 (1969); Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 22.
24. See About the National Science Foundation, Nat’l Sci. Found., http://www.nsf.gov/
about/ (last visited May 12, 2015).
25. See NSF Organizational List, Nat’l Sci. Found., http://www.nsf.gov/staff/orglist.jsp
(last visited May 12, 2015).
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greater knowledge about which scientific projects are likely to yield important results than any congressional committee or committee staff could realistically acquire. Furthermore, the highly effective peer-review process used
by the NSF to judge grant applications would be difficult politically for Congress to use.26 Thus Congress’s role is limited primarily to setting funding
levels and articulating the most general policy agenda,27 leaving the discretion to determine which projects get funded to NSF experts.28 The same
delegate-to-the-experts principle applies on a grander scale to any major
regulatory legislation, such as the Food and Drug Act29 or the Clean Air
Act.30
Although members of Congress and congressional staff can become relatively well versed in general policy goals, the details of implementation simply have to be delegated. Of course, individual legislators and their staffs are
capable of developing important expertise on any number of policy questions. But it is unrealistic to expect legislators to maintain detailed knowledge of how to best implement policy in the whole range of areas affected by
federal law. In theory, Congress could create a committee for every major
policy issue, staffed with experts who would spend of all their waking hours
working out detailed legislative solutions to every regulatory issue. In such a
world, the committees would fill in details rather than the agencies. But that
division of labor is generally considered inefficient in every policymaking
area other than tax. However capable their staffs, members of Congress
would be inappropriate and overtaxed supervisors if they needed to work
through all of the issues apt to arise. To the contrary, the more efficient
place to insert such detailed, specialized, and constantly updated expertise in
the lawmaking process is with an agency postenactment.
The congressional staff that drafted the broad delegations in the Clean
Air Act,31 for example, probably knew at the time of enactment a great deal
about the need to regulate air quality generally and the hazards of pollution
to human well-being and the environment. But they would not have been
expected to keep up to date on all of the subsequent scientific advances and
accumulating knowledge concerning pollutants that threaten public health
and what should be done about them. That is why the statute, for example,
26. See How We Work, Nat’l Sci. Found., http://www.nsf.gov/about/how.jsp (last visited
May 12, 2015).
27. The enacting statute provided the general directive to, among other things, “develop
and encourage the pursuit of a national policy for the promotion of basic research and education in the sciences . . . initiate and support basic scientific research . . . and to appraise the
impact of research upon industrial development and upon the general welfare.” National Science Foundation Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-507, § 3(a), 64 Stat. 149, 149.
28. See id. Congress has recently taken a more active role in overseeing the funding decisions of the NSF. See, e.g., Paul Basken, NSF-Backed Scientists Raise Alarm over Deepening
Congressional Inquiry, Chron. Higher Educ. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/
NSF-Backed-Scientists-Raise/149407.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (2012).
31. Id.
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empowers the EPA to determine which pollutants might “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” in the motor vehicle context.32 Of course, no one really disagrees that Congress needs to delegate the
detail work. The harder question is whether Congress should delegate the
more substantive policy choices, and this Article argues that perhaps it
should—or that the case for delegating choices is as strong with tax as
elsewhere.
Inherent differences between the process of issuing regulations and the
process of passing statutes provides another common justification for broad
congressional delegations of lawmaking power.33 Even when the legislative
process is working well, it may take longer for Congress to pass a law than it
takes an agency to make a rule. As a result, agencies can react more quickly
to new information than Congress can, including recent scientific findings
and changed circumstances. In addition, the nature of the legislative process
inhibits action.34 This can be true, for example, when there is consensus that
some action should be taken with respect to a particular problem, but there
is deep division—say, between Republicans and Democrats, or within either
party—on what precisely, if anything, should be done. In such a case, a
broad and somewhat vague delegation of authority by Congress can permit
legislators to take credit for successful policies, while reserving the ability to
duck responsibility for the final outcome.35
One real-world example of this phenomenon, already mentioned, was
the closing of military bases in the late 1980s and early 1990s.36 Observers
agreed at the time that the rapid decline of the Soviet military threat necessitated a radical reduction of the size of the U.S. military.37 Moreover,
there was a consensus specifically that the number of military bases was

32. Id. § 7521(a)(1).
33. See, e.g., Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 14, at 14–33 (reviewing the extensive
political science literature on congressional delegation).
34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1441, 1444–48 (2008).
35. For this method to advance lawmaker interests, voters must credit them for having
addressed a problem, but not hold them fully responsible for the distress caused by an agency
or commission in exercising its broad discretion. Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 22, at 89.
36. This section draws heavily from Kenneth R. Mayer, Closing Military Bases (Finally):
Solving Collective Dilemmas Through Delegation, 20 Legis. Stud. Q. 393 (1995); see also Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 14, at 1–4.
37. See, e.g., Stephen M. Goldfein, Nat’l War Coll., The Base Realignment and
Closure Commission: A Successful Strategy to Overcome Political Gridlock 1
(1994), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a440641.pdf (“The collapse of communism and
disintegration of the Soviet Union left a diminished threat and precipitated a reduction in the
size of the US armed forces. The military base structure designed to accommodate a much
larger Cold War force could no longer be maintained, especially in a much constrained budget
environment. There seemed to be a general consensus across the nation that base consolidation and closure could cut fat, without affecting the muscle of the armed forces.”).
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untenable.38 The difficulty, however, was that any member of Congress who
voted for a measure that closed a base in his or her own jurisdiction risked
political suicide. This presented a major collective action problem: a change
that clearly enhanced welfare, and that needed to be made, could not be
directly enacted given individual lawmakers’ incentives. Congress could,
however, vote to solve the problem indirectly, and it did. In 1988 Congress
passed the Base Closure and Realignment Act, which created an independent
commission with legal authority to determine which bases to close, subject
to Congress’s right to overturn the proposal through a joint resolution.39
Under the Act, the head of each military service first submitted a list of
recommended base closures to the Secretary of Defense, who could add to
or subtract from that list.40 The secretary then submitted the revised list to
the commission, which in turn had the power to add or subtract bases.41 At
that point, the final list of recommended base closures went to the President,
who could either approve the list (with no changes) or veto it, starting the
whole process over.42 If the President approved the list, the Secretary of Defense then had the authority to begin implementing the closures on the list,
unless Congress halted the process within forty-five days of presidential approval by issuing a joint resolution.43
Congress has adopted similar mechanisms in other areas. The ACA, for
example, delegates enormous Medicare cost-cutting authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the newly created IPAB.44 Under the
ACA, the IPAB, consisting of fifteen experts named by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, has the authority to recommend policy changes to
Congress to cut Medicare costs. These recommendations can include “ideas
on coordinating care, getting rid of waste in the system, incentivizing best
practices, and prioritizing primary care.”45 What is interesting about these
recommendations is the way in which they create legislative pressure to cut
Medicare costs. First, Congress can accept IPAB’s recommendations and enact them into law. Or, alternatively, “[i]f Congress rejects the recommendations, and Medicare spending exceeds specific targets, Congress must either
38. Mayer, supra note 36, at 396 (“[B]y 1988 it was clear to members that the military
base structure bordered on the preposterous, and it was increasingly difficult to argue that
every base was essential to national security.”).
39. Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-526, §§ 201–02, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627–28 (1988) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 2687 (2012)).
40. Mayer, supra note 36, at 393.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 394.
43. Id.
44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3403, 124 Stat.
119, 489–507 (2011); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board,
363 New Eng. J. Med. 103, 103–04 (2010); Nancy-Ann DeParle, The Facts About the Independent Payment Advisory Board, White House Blog (Apr. 20, 2011, 5:46 PM), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/20/facts-about-independent-payment-advisory-board.
45. DeParle, supra note 44.
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enact policies that achieve equivalent savings or let the Secretary of Health
and Human Services follow IPAB’s recommendations.”46
The parallels between this delegation and the base-closure delegation are
obvious. At the most general level, Congress created the IPAB to address the
need to cut healthcare costs, a need that virtually everyone agrees is essential
to the long-term fiscal well-being of the country; likewise, Congress created
the base closure commission to address the need to cut military expenditures, about which, again, there was general agreement.47 Moreover, the collective action problem that inhibited Congress from making military
spending cuts through the normal legislative process (no legislator wanting
to vote for a law that kills a military base in his or her state) has analogs in
the healthcare context. For example, although it was universally agreed that
cutting Medicare costs would enhance overall public welfare, individual legislators resisted competitive bidding that could undermine their ability to
secure contracts for medical device manufacturers or pharmaceutical companies in their own districts.48
The arguments against broad delegation of powers are also well known,
concentrating largely on issues of legitimacy and accountability.49 Granting
agencies broad authority raises the possibility that they will enact regulations
inconsistent with congressional intent. Furthermore, even if the regulations
adopted by an agency reflect what Congress intended, the mere procedural
fact that an agency rather than Congress is directly responsible for the final
product may worsen the public perception of its legitimacy.50 An elected
Congress is endowed with the power and responsibility to make national
laws, and answers to voters if it performs poorly in doing so.51 Congress
generally holds open hearings and votes, permitting voters to understand
their representatives’ contributions to legislative outcomes, and to a certain
degree, why legislators voted the way they did. It may be more difficult for
voters to hold Congress accountable for the actions of an agency, even if
46. Id.
47. See sources cited supra notes 39–40, 44.
48. Harold Pollack, The Real Problem with the Independent Payment Advisory Board, Am.
Prospect (Apr. 23, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/real-problem-independent-payment-advisory-board. For an in-depth discussion of the mechanics of the board, see Bagley, supra note
7, at 569–71. The analogy is not perfect, of course.
49. See, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of
the United States 93 (2d ed. 1979) (asserting that “the principle of broad and unguided
delegation of power” is hostile to law itself); David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation 13–19 (1993) (arguing
that delegation undermines democracy by allowing Congress and the President to avoid hard
choices, jeopardizes liberty by bypassing the legislative process, and expands the federal government’s regulatory jurisdiction too far); Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 22, at 82–85
(discussing the arguments put forth by critics of broad delegation, including that such delegation is undemocratic and reduces public welfare); Schuck, supra note 22, at 777–83, (criticizing standard arguments against broad delegation).
50. See Mayer, supra note 36, at 407.
51. See Schoenbrod, supra note 49, at 14.
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Congress created the agency while fully anticipating its future behavior.52 As
a result, delegation arguably reduces the democratic nature of the system,
undermining the legitimacy of its actions.
These are valid concerns, although they have often been overstated by
the leading critics of broad delegation to agencies.53 First, if an agency acts in
a way that substantially diverges from the wishes of the legislature, Congress
can pass another statute to restrict or remove the agency’s authority. Numerous examples from the era of deregulation support this claim. To take
one famous example, when Congress determined that the regulation of the
airline industry was not working well, thereby producing excessively high
fares, overcapacity, and inefficient nonprice competition (among other
problems) it responded with a statute that “deregulated” the industry and
abolished the Civil Aeronautics Board, the agency that was responsible for
price and quantity regulation.54 Similar stories can be told about deregulation of other industries, including telecommunications, energy, and finance.
Whether these deregulatory efforts have, in retrospect, been net benefits to
society is often debated. But that is beside the current point, which is this:
when Congress decides that an agency has gone too far, Congress is capable
of reining that agency in, one way or another.
This is not a complete response, of course, since one of the reasons for
delegation is the inability of Congress to act, and the political coalition that
passed the delegating statute in the first place may be difficult or impossible
to put together to pass constraining or clarifying legislation. This is especially a concern in a world of congressional gridlock, marked by record-low
enactment of laws.55 Nevertheless, Congress’s power to pass new laws does
serve as a constraint on agency discretion, at least in cases involving obvious
agency overreach.
Second, public opinion can be channeled to affect agency action. In the
case of executive agencies, the President’s policy preferences also constrain
agency discretion, and the electorate in turn renders judgment over the President’s management of the executive branch. Indeed, some argue that being
accountable to the President, who is more attuned to the preferences of the
majority of national voters than is any member of Congress, is more democratic than being accountable to Congress.56 In addition, the notice and
52. See id. at 14, 89–90.
53. See generally Schuck, supra note 22, at 784–93.
54. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705. See generally
Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 197–221, 317–40 (1982) (describing economics and politics of airline regulation and deregulation).
55. Congress’s lack of productivity in recent years is well documented. See Drew
DeSilver, In Late Spurt of Activity, Congress Avoids ‘Least Productive’ Title, Pew Res. Center
(Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activitycongress-avoids-least-productive-title/.
56. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L.
Rev. 23, 59 (1995). One important example of presidential involvement in the regulatory
process is through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Under Executive
Order 12866, the President directs agencies that are promulgating rules to consider various
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comment process that agencies use in crafting regulations and that partly
justifies their authority allows interested parties to draw public and congressional attention to instances of potential regulatory overreach. Media coverage also ensures accountability for high-profile issues. If an agency does
something egregiously bad, voters find out, and Congress can be animated
to act.
Third, judicial review constrains agency discretion. Courts are often
called on to determine whether an agency has exceeded its legislative authority. Even if Congress were to convey broadly worded authority to an agency,
the application of that authority in particular situations can be challenged in
court by the affected parties.
Finally, there are agency norms that significantly influence the actions of
professional staff and even political appointees. Regulatory agencies are
staffed by professionals whose reputations and long-run effectiveness depend on high levels of competence, as well as a certain degree of political
independence.
There is a related criticism that broad congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to agencies permits Congress to avoid accountability by
shifting blame to agencies if some voters are unhappy.57 Indeed, this Article
notes that the ability to shift blame may make it possible for Congress to
enact some beneficial reforms that political dynamics would otherwise prevent. Critics argue that the federal government should not be able to wield
its power to interfere with economic activity, or with individual liberty, unless a certain number of legislators representing disparate parts of the country can publicly agree that doing so makes sense.58 Exactly how Congress
ought to express its policy preferences is potentially a separate question.
There are some who argue that having Congress enact more general standards, with the specifics of implementation left to agencies, actually enhances Congress’s accountability.59 Professor Sunstein notes that, as a
general matter, “[t]here is no evidence that agencies operating pursuant to
open-ended authority do better, on any dimension, than agencies operating
pursuant to statutes that sharply limit their discretion; nothing appears to
link agency performance with statutory clarity.”60 More specifically, there is
no evidence that agencies do better at maximizing social welfare when they
are given a very specific statute than when they are given general guidance.61
alternatives to those rules and to perform a cost–benefit analysis of the proposed rules. Office
of Mgmt. & Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Q&A’s, The White
House (Nov. 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/OIRA_QsandAs.
57. See Schoenbrod, supra note 49.
58. See id. at 15–16, 110.
59. See Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 22, at 95–99; Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2080–82 (2005);
Schuck, supra note 22, at 781–83.
60. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 324; see also Mashaw, Greed, supra note 22, at 142–45.
61. Stewart, supra note 3, at 328 & n.28 (noting the “speculative and doubtful character
of the gains to be achieved” in invalidating broad statutory delegations); see also Mashaw,
Prodelegation, supra note 22, at 91–93.
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While there is no shortage of normative arguments for and against
broad delegation of authority by Congress to agencies, the point that should
be emphasized is that Congress has—in virtually every policy domain other
than tax—determined that the balance of the arguments weighs in favor of
broad delegation. But not with tax. The modern practice of engaging in
broad delegation takes an atypical form in tax legislation, where the IRS is
limited it its ability to modify tax rules and not permitted to modify tax
rates.62 From a normative standpoint it is not at all clear why tax should be
exceptional in this regard. The arguments in favor of delegation in other
legal spheres, that Congress has apparently found to be compelling, would
seem to apply with equal or greater force to tax law as to other laws.
But is tax different? Is there something special about the nature of tax
law or the tax lawmaking process that favors a different approach, one that
leaves many more of the details to congressional committees than is the case
in most other areas of lawmaking? Before addressing this question it is helpful to review what tax functions Congress already delegates and how they
differ from the sort of broad delegation it might adopt.
II. Current Tax Delegation
It is commonly understood that U.S. tax policy is, to a remarkable (and
unusual) extent, determined by Congress not only in its broad outlines but
also in its details. Congress enacts the statutes that together compose the
IRC. The IRC defines the tax base and sets tax rates, which together determine each taxpayer’s liability.63 The IRC contains lengthy and detailed definitions of most of the key terms in the federal tax laws, usually leaving only
a modest amount of substance to be decided by the Treasury Department
and the IRS,64 although there are exceptions, some noted below. Thus, although Congress often delegates authority to the Treasury Department, in
the vast majority of cases the regulations and other guidance produced by
Treasury serve the function of interpreting or filling in the gaps of an already
very detailed IRC.65 More specifically, most Treasury guidance is directed at
defining the assets subject to taxation as well as handling issues of timing,
attribution, and characterization, such as whether an item of income is capital or ordinary, and the extent to which expenses are deductible.66 Congress
rarely enacts very general tax provisions, with the expectation that Treasury,
or some other regulatory agency, will fill in the details.
62. For instance, see Part II for the discussion of I.R.C. § 7805(a) and related issues.
63. I.R.C. §§ 1–59 (2012).
64. See, e.g., id. § 2.
65. In a 2006 study, the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association noted that, in
addition to the general authority given to Treasury under IRC § 7805, discussed immediately
below, “there are more than 550 individual provisions of the Code that provide grants of
authority to promulgate regulations.” N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Legislative Grants of Regulatory Authority 2–3 (2006) [hereinafter NYSBA Report], http://
old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1121Report.pdf.
66. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1(h)-1, 1.162-5 (2014).

November 2015]

Delegating Tax

249

Congress has enacted a provision that provides some general regulatory
authority to the Treasury Department. IRC § 7805(a) provides that “the Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for
the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code].”67 In addition, several sections of the IRC explicitly call on the secretary to provide regulations for
interpretation and enforcement of those code sections. An example of this in
§ 25A, which provides education tax credits.68 Congress also imposes limits
on Treasury’s rulemaking authority, including restrictions on any retroactive
impact of new regulations69 and limits on the duration of temporary regulations.70 Courts grant Treasury regulations broad authority. For example, in
2011 the Supreme Court in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States held that tax regulations are eligible for Chevron deference, making them enforceable unless determined to be arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute to which they apply.71
In addition to its role in crafting regulations, together with the rest of
the Treasury Department, the IRS in its role as tax enforcer issues guidance
to taxpayers and to its own offices. The IRS issues revenue rulings and revenue procedures, which are public, and which offer its interpretation of tax
situations.72 Revenue rulings and revenue procedures have historically not
been considered to have the force of law or even the authority of Treasury
regulations, nor can taxpayers necessarily rely on them, although courts tend
to be sympathetic to taxpayers whose tax payments are deemed deficient by
the IRS, despite following the guidance of revenue rulings or revenue procedures.73 And there are many less formal, though also public, ways in which
the IRS transmits its interpretation of tax situations, including private rulings, determination letters, and technical advice memoranda.
Typical congressional tax delegation amounts to fleshing out the details—filling in the missing definitions—of provisions whose basic policy
design was already put into place by statute. Treasury regulations under IRC
67. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
68. Id. § 25A.
69. Id. § 7805(b).
70. Id. § 7805(e).
71. See 562 U.S. 44, 53–58 (2011).
72. The IRS publishes its revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and other statements of
tax interpretation in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. See Internal Revenue Bulletins, IRS, http://
apps.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/internalRevenueBulletins.html (last updated May 7, 2015).
73. The Tax Court has long considered revenue rulings, procedures, and notices to be
mere statements of the IRS Commissioner’s litigation position. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Comm’r,
117 T.C. 159, 174 n.6 (2001); McLaulin v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 255, 263 (2000), cited in Kristin
E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 504 n.209 (2013). As Professor
Hickman argues, however, there is increasingly good reason to regard revenue rulings, procedures, notices and other Internal Revenue Bulletin (IRB) guidance as having “the force of law”
that would entitle such materials to eligibility for Chevron deference. See Hickman, supra, at
504–06 (noting the increasingly substantive and less procedural nature of IRB guidance and
the assignment of greater legal significance to these documents by the IRS and Treasury).
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§ 162 and § 263 offer examples. IRC § 162 permits taxpayers to claim deductions for “ordinary and necessary” business expenses, but IRS § 263(a)
denies taxpayers immediate tax deductions for “any amount paid out for
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.”74 The idea behind IRC § 263(a),
which is quite consistent with the rest of the IRC, is that the costs of permanent improvements should be capitalized into the value of a property, much
like the treatment of new investments. This means that taxpayers are not
entitled to immediate deductions for improvement expenses, though the
capitalization contributes to the asset’s basis for the purpose of taking future
depreciation deductions and in calculating gains or losses when assets are
ultimately sold. These two code sections leave largely unanswered the knotty
question of exactly how one distinguishes expenses for ordinary repairs,
which are immediately deductible under IRC § 162, from expenses for permanent improvement, which are not. It is this sort of tax lawmaking authority—over fine-tuning the income tax base—that Congress is willing to
delegate to Treasury.
Treasury uses its regulatory authority. For example, in 1960 Treasury
issued regulation 1.162-4, which explained that “[t]he cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its life but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condition
may be deducted as an expense.”75 In addition, it issued regulation 1.263(a)1(b), which adds that taxpayers may not deduct “amounts paid or incurred
(1) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful life, of property
owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt property
to a new or different use.”76 For many years, courts used these regulations to
determine which expenses are immediately deductible repairs and which
must be capitalized as improvements, to be deducted later through depreciation.77 This case law, however, proved confusing and inconsistent. In 2001
the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2001-4, which identified different scenarios
of expenses in the particular context of airframe repair and overhaul, distinguishing types of expenditures that the IRS considered to be deductible repairs from those it considered to be nondeductible improvements.78 And in
2014, following earlier temporary regulations, Treasury provided even more
specific and comprehensive guidance in the form of additional regulations

74. I.R.C. §§ 162, 263(a).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1960) (amended 2014).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (1960) (current version at Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3
(2014)).
77. See, e.g., Moss v. Comm’r, 831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wehrli, 400
F.2d 686, 687–89 (10th Cir. 1968); Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 532,
537–41 (2000); Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 333, 337–41 (1962).
78. Rev. Rul. 2001-4, 2001-1 C.B. 295.
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whose purpose was to further clarify the meaning of the relevant code sections, and which had the effect of further restricting the ability of taxpayers
to claim immediate deductions.79
These Treasury regulations and revenue rulings, which reflect both the
issue’s complexity and the Treasury’s changing understanding of conditions
affecting U.S. taxpayers, evolved without any accompanying legislative
changes to the relevant portions of the underlying IRC § 162 and § 263.
While Congress conceivably could have legislated the same regulations on
the same time schedule, it is just as unrealistic to expect it to do so for tax
law as it would be for Congress to legislate regulations in every other area of
national policy that it currently delegates to federal agencies.
This tax lawmaking pattern is very common: Congress enacts a code
section intended to help define the meaning of taxable income (much of the
IRC is devoted to defining taxable income), followed by a series of judicial
interpretations of that code section. Next, Treasury regulations and other
published guidance interpret the same code section (sometimes adopting,
sometimes refining, sometimes rejecting the interpretive glosses provided by
the courts), occasionally followed by further statutory refinements, and the
process repeats. The same history describes many sections in the Code.
What is rare, however, is for Congress to enact a tax provision that sets forth
the general tax policy goal to be achieved and that expressly authorizes the
Treasury Department to fill in the details with regulations. Moreover, on the
few occasions when Congress has done so, the tax policy goal it articulated
involved definition of the base and minimization of tax avoidance behavior.
Two unusual examples of the latter phenomenon are § 482 and § 1502.
Section 482 concerns the allocation of income between related parties, an
issue primarily in international transactions when corporate taxpayers typically have incentives to arrange the nature and pricing of intercompany deals
in order to claim that income is earned in low-tax rather than high-tax jurisdictions. Section 482, exactly two sentences long, empowers the Secretary of
the Treasury to allocate income and deductions “in order to prevent evasion
of taxes or clearly to reflect . . . income.”80 The Treasury Department, on
behalf of the secretary, has issued voluminous regulations under § 482,
thereby assuming the entire responsibility for its definition and
enforcement.81
A second example of unusually broad tax delegation involves the rules
governing consolidated income tax returns of related corporations. Under
IRC § 1501, all members of an affiliated group of corporations may elect to
file a consolidated return.82 An “affiliated group” includes corporations that
79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3 (2014).
80. I.R.C. § 482 (2012).
81. See International Income Taxation 102, 1236–420 (Robert J. Peroni et al. eds.,
2013-2014 ed. 2013) (in which the (unabridged) text of IRC § 482 fills less than one-quarter of
a page on page 102, whereas the § 482 Treasury regulations occupy 184 pages).
82. I.R.C. § 1501.
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are related through a common parent corporation that owns at least 80 percent (in terms of voting power and value) of the subsidiary’s stock.83 One of
the primary tax benefits of filing a consolidated return for a group of related
corporations is the ability to share net operating losses within the group.84
This benefits the taxpayer by permitting losses incurred by related corporations to be deducted from profits earned by other related corporations in
calculating the taxable income of the group; in the absence of consolidation
the losses would not be deductible so the group would have greater tax liabilities. Given the complexity of corporate structures and the intricacy of
corporate tax laws in general, a comprehensive regime of consolidated return tax laws would require an extraordinary amount of detail. In a single
sentence in § 1502, Congress delegated the job of fleshing out those rules
almost entirely to the Treasury Department:
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem necessary in
order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of corporations making a
consolidated return and of each corporation in the group, both during and
after the period of affiliation, may be returned, determined, computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such manner as clearly to reflect the income-tax liability and the various factors necessary for the determination
of such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of such tax liability.85

After the enactment of this section, Treasury did in fact respond with one of
the longest and most intricate sets of regulations in the entire Code of Federal Regulations.86
In both of these examples, it can be argued that Congress in effect acknowledged the limits of rule-based tax lawmaking. That is, Congress understood that it would be inefficient to attempt to adopt a detailed set of
related-party transactional rules and consolidated-return rules by statute.
For example, the conditions under which a particular set of rules would be
optimal could quickly change, especially given the strong motivation of sophisticated taxpayers to exploit loopholes in tax statutes. Indeed, the general
grant of regulatory authority found in IRC § 7805 can be understood in the
same light: because Congress cannot anticipate every way in which clever
taxpayers will aggressively interpret even the most detailed tax provisions,
Treasury must be given broad and general enforcement authority—the
power to adopt regulations that themselves close statutory loopholes.87 This
83. Id. § 1504.
84. Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Understanding Consolidated Returns, 12 Fla. Tax Rev. 125,
129–34 (2012).
85. I.R.C. § 1502 (2012).
86. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-0 to -100 (2014). In a 2006 report on different types of
grants of regulatory authority by Congress to Treasury over tax matters, the NYSBA Tax Section listed § 1502 as the sole example of a tax delegation “to implement concepts that are
expressed only in general terms.” NYSBA Report, supra note 65, at 2.
87. The challenge in applying IRC § 7805 lies in distinguishing potential regulations that
implement congressional intent as expressed in the Code from potential regulations that
would effectively supplant congressionally enacted tax laws, and this can be a difficult line to
walk. In several cases the courts have invalidated IRS regulations issued under the IRS’s general
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is precisely the argument that justifies the existence of a general anti-avoidance rule (which many countries, including the United States, have codified88) that the IRS and the courts can apply when interpreting the detailed
tax rules.89
These types of broad delegation are consistent with the arguments this
Article puts forth, and there are advantages of doing more of the same. For
example, in other areas of tax law in which compliance issues are especially
difficult to foresee at the statutory drafting stage, Congress might enact general grants of authority to Treasury to issue the rules and regulations necessary to ensure clear reflection of income and to prevent avoidance. What
Congress has been reluctant to do, however, is to enact statutes that grant to
Treasury, or to some other agency, broad authority to make tax policy beyond enforcement or base definition. In particular, the next Part suggests
three different dimensions of tax policymaking that Congress might delegate, all of which go well beyond existing tax law delegation.
III. Expanding Tax Delegation
Some types of tax lawmaking power Congress just does not delegate. For
example, Congress has never given the Treasury Department the power to
set marginal tax rates or levels of tax credits. Instead, as mentioned, Treasury
regulations concern appropriate definitions of taxable income, deductions,
expenditures that are eligible for tax credits, and similar features of taxpayer
situations.90 In addition, Congress, so far as we are aware, has never delegated any sort of income tax lawmaking power to a body other than the
Treasury Department—for example, to the Federal Reserve, or to an independent commission.91 This Part sketches a picture of what expanded delegation might look like—expanded in terms of the types of tax lawmaking
power delegated and the bodies to whom the power is given. These examples, though largely without direct precedent in the tax area, offer potential
solutions to major problems and therefore deserve serious consideration.
They also pose potential concerns, which again raise the question whether
tax is different from other areas of law. We return to those questions below.
regulatory authority, as in, for example, Iglesias v. United States, 848 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1988), a
case that concerns an IRS regulation pertaining to I.R.C. § 861.
88. I.R.C. § 7701(o); Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General AntiAvoidance Rules, 54 SMU L. Rev. 83, 84 (2001).
89. This rule—known as the economic substance doctrine—long existed as a matter of
tax common law in the United States, and has recently been codified. See I.R.C. § 7701(o); see
also Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 339,
365–68 (2005) (explaining the need for general anti-avoidance standard to prevent abuse of
rule-based tax system); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860,
861 (1999) (explaining how a purely rule-based approach to tax would lead to excessive complexity in the law).
90. Certain tax base definitions can influence effective marginal tax rates by conditioning
the availability of tax credits, deductions, or income inclusions on receipt of marginal income.
91. See infra note 107 (noting that agencies other than the Treasury Department are,
however, frequently authorized to adopt user fees).
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A. Delegating the Design of Tax Subsidy Programs
Congress might expand its delegation of tax lawmaking authority by
enacting more open-ended, general statutory provisions that provide guidance as to the tax policy goals that it wishes to achieve, but that leave the
Treasury Department to work out the policy details. Consider, for example,
the possibility of Congress delegating to Treasury the job of designing provisions intended to encourage particular types of investments. The research
and experimentation (R&E) tax credit offers a specific example. The R&E
credit is a tax subsidy program whose obvious purpose is to encourage investment in certain types of R&E expenditures. As currently designed, most
of the important instrument-design choices with respect to the R&E tax
credit—as with most of the important instrument-design choices regarding
every tax subsidy program—are found in the tax code itself.92 Our argument
is that the R&E tax credit, and other provisions of that ilk, might be more
effective if Congress delegated more open-ended authority, giving Treasury
more of a hand in the design of the policy instrument.
IRC § 41(a)(1) currently offers a credit for 20 percent of “qualified research expenses” over the “base amount.”93 The Code in turn defines qualified research as research “undertaken for the purpose of discovering
information . . . which is technological in nature” and “the application of
which is intended to be useful in the development of a new or improved
business component of the taxpayer,” and whose primary purpose is learning more about “a new or improved function” or “performance” or “reliability or quality.”94 The base amount is defined, again in the Code, as the
product of average annual gross receipts in the previous four years and the
average ratio of qualified research spending relative to gross receipts by the
same taxpayer during 1984–1988.95 The Treasury Department has issued
regulations, and other guidance, to adjust these definitions around the
edges—for example, to elaborate on the meaning of qualified expenditures.96
However, few of the important design choices with respect to the R&E tax
credit have been delegated to Treasury.
The primary challenge in designing the R&E credit is to find a way to
both encourage greater research spending and to avoid providing tax credits
for research that would have been undertaken without the credit. As a general matter, it is impossible empirically to distinguish research that would
have taken place in the absence of the credit from marginal research for
which the credit is responsible.97 The particular design of the R&E credit in
92. I.R.C. § 41.
93. Id. § 41(a)(1).
94. Id. § 41(d).
95. Id. § 41(c).
96. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4 (2014).
97. Note that this is not inconsistent with the many statistical findings that tax benefits
encourage significantly greater research spending, reviewed in Nirupama Rao, Do Tax Credits
Stimulate R&D Spending? The Effect of the R&D Tax Credit in its First Decade (The Wagner
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the Code takes a stab at doing so, offering greater tax benefits to firms that
significantly increase their research spending relative to historical averages,
adjusted for changes in gross revenues. Because of the nature of statutory
drafting, however, Congress possessed limited design choices—hence the use
of the four-year average and the baseline percentage from the 1980s.98
One could imagine delegating more authority to the Treasury to pursue
Congress’s goal of encouraging research. Instead of enacting a statute that
details how the credit will work, the statute could be more open ended,
articulating the general goals that Congress wants the agency to pursue.
Congress could give Treasury the general mandate of increasing investment
in research and experimentation that maximizes the long-run benefit to the
U.S. economy (in terms of minimizing unemployment or maximizing GDP
growth or some other benchmark). Treasury could then be left to structure
the tax benefit in the way that most efficiently achieves these goals. In pursuit of those stated goals, Treasury might indeed choose to offer a credit for
research exceeding historical levels. Or it might not. And the credit percentage might vary over time, depending on what produces the best response
and how demand for various types of research investments changes over
time. Likewise, Treasury might fine-tune the definition of qualified expense,
as experience and ongoing research reveal where the credit should be
focused.
What is important is that Treasury could experiment with tailoring the
tax credit in different ways in different years, or for different activities during the same years, to identify the most effective method of encouraging
research. An executive agency charged by Congress with trying to stimulate
research might be more willing than Congress itself to experiment with alternative approaches despite hostile reactions from some affected taxpayers,
understanding that some approaches will be unsuccessful, but persisting
with the experiments in the belief that they improve tax policy in the long
run.
Greater delegation does not mean the absence of congressional control.
It is unlikely, of course, that Congress would delegate the design of a spending mandate without a budget. Congress would likely instead appropriate a
predetermined amount of funding for Treasury Department promotion of
R&E to accompany its greater discretion. Congress could budget a particular
amount of money that Treasury could, or even must, spend to encourage
research and experimentation. U.S. corporations claimed $8.5 billion of research credits in 2010;99 and according to Treasury, the R&E tax credit was

Sch., N.Y. Univ., Research Paper No. 2272174, 2013), http://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/do-tax-credits-stimulate-r-d-spending.pdf.
98. See I.R.C. §§ 41(c)(1), 41(c)(3).
99. SOI Tax Stats – Corporation Research Credit, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-TaxStats-Corporation-Research-Credit (last updated Mar. 12, 2015).
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responsible for at least one dollar of additional private sector research investment for every dollar of tax credit provided.100 The Obama administration
has proposed making the credit percentage permanent and increasing it, in
hope of spending $100 billion on R&E tax credits over ten years.101
This spending plan could be delegated, with the spending limit perhaps
monitored by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The same sort of delegation could occur with other types of tax incentive provisions. For example,
Congress could delegate the design of other, more narrowly tailored credits
(such as the electric vehicle credit) and deductions meant to encourage
equipment investment (such as bonus depreciation).102 Congress could also
accompany any particular tax subsidy delegation with not only a spending
budget, but also a range of required distributional outcomes, as discussed
further in the next Section.
Another alternative would be for Congress to remove such subsidies
from the tax code entirely and place them on the spending side of the
budget. Under this approach, the subsidies would be supervised by agencies
other than Treasury with expertise in the substantive policy areas in question. For example, the R&E credit might indeed be placed on the spending
side, under the auspices of an agency staffed with experts in research and
development policy instead of experts in tax enforcement. Such a spendingside alternative would be consistent with a particular critique of the use of
tax expenditures generally. On this view, tax expenditures—provisions in
the IRC that deviate from “normal” taxation in ways that subsidize particular activities103—are bad policy because they require both the IRS and Treasury, as well as the tax writing committees, to engage in a type of analysis for
which they lack expertise. While the IRS is designed to police compliance
with the tax code and to issue regulations to fill in gaps where the Code is
ambiguous or unclear, it is not so well suited to make policy in the areas of
research and experimentation, education, or health care. If the Treasury Department is not the agency best situated—in terms of expertise and institutional capacity—to design and maintain a particular subsidy provision,
some other agency should be chosen. The general point is that broad discretionary delegation, even if nominally implicating “tax” issues, should be
100. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Investing in U.S. Competitiveness: The Benefits
of Enhancing the Research and Experimentation (R&E) Tax Credit 4 (2011), http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Investing-in-US-CompetitivenessBenefits-of-RandE-Tax-Credit-3-2011.pdf.
101. The White House, Expanded, Simplified and Permanent Research and Experimentation Tax Credit (2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/fact_sheet_recredit_9-8-10.pdf.
102. If Congress were to delegate additional lawmaking authority of this sort to the Treasury Department, the agency’s tendency to promulgate interpretive rulings that have binding
(or nearly binding) authority without going through the formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking process would need to be reconsidered. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of
Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act
Rulemaking Requirements, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1153 (2008).
103. James R. White, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Tax Expenditures: Background and Evaluation Criteria and Questions 1, 8 (2012).
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made to the agency best equipped to make the important policy choices on
the ground.
B. Delegating Tax Rates
Although Congress frequently delegates authority over definition of the
income tax base (comprising much of the work of the Treasury Department), delegation of the power to set income tax rates is unprecedented.
Traditionally, the statutes specify income tax rates in excruciating detail in
IRC § 1 for individuals and § 11 for corporations, with different marginal
tax rates applying to different “brackets” of income.104 These legislated marginal tax rates change from time to time, either as the result of a change in
the political party controlling the federal government (since the major parties often disagree about the appropriate degree of progressivity in the rate
structure) or as the result of an unexpected need for additional revenue or
fiscal stimulus.105 Other than delegating the job of indexing brackets for inflation to Treasury,106 however, Congress maintains sole responsibility for
determining the rate structure. That is, although Congress frequently delegates to agencies the power to set “user fees,” it has never delegated the
power to set income tax rates to the Treasury Department or to any other
regulatory body.107 Why not?
Congress may retain control over income tax rates because they play an
especially important role in the distribution of tax burdens. Indeed, some
would argue that this is one of the primary ways, if not the primary way, in
which tax law differs from other areas of law. That is, when we ask “how is
tax different?” or “why not tax?” when it comes to broad delegations of
authority, it is the concern over control of distributional consequences—and
the role of tax rates in determining distributional consequences—that is the
most common answer we receive. Some view the distribution of tax burdens
to be a quintessentially political decision entailing tradeoffs among different
groups of taxpayers whose interests are best represented and given voice in

104. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (2012).
105. In addition, there are nominal changes in marginal tax rate brackets due to automatic inflation indexing. Id. § 1(f).
106. See id.
107. Congress frequently delegates to an agency the power to set “rates” or “fees” for
specified activities. The authority for such fees comes either from particular statutes or from
the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, ch. 376, 65 Stat. 268 (1951). See generally
Susan J. Irving, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Federal User Fees: A Design Guide
(2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203357.pdf. User fees are distinguished from taxes in
that the former have a “user pay” element; that is, they are supposed to be related either to the
benefit received by the regulated party or to the cost imposed by that party on the agency in
question. “Taxes,” by contrast, are generally assessed according to some measurement of ability
to pay and are not necessarily tied to costs imposed or benefits received. Id. at 3–5. In the
history of the income tax, however, Congress has not delegated the power to set income tax
rates, individual or corporate.
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the rough-and-tumble of the tax legislative process. And such decisions, the
argument goes, must rest with Congress alone.108
The difficulty with attributing congressional reluctance to delegate ratesetting to this consideration, however, is that Congress frequently delegates
decisions that have distributional consequences similar to those of tax policy
choices to other agencies. For example, Congress permits the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration to craft rules that impose significant responsibility for workplace safety, with accompanying distributional consequences for workers and firms.109 Rules enacted by the Environmental
Protection Agency similarly affect the distribution of benefits and burdens of
protecting the environment. Prior to the wave of federal deregulation in the
1970s and afterward, federal regulation of energy, telecommunications, and
other utilities often focused explicitly on pricing structures designed to
achieve distributional objectives.110 The efficiency and distributional goals
that motivated, and that motivate, this and other federal regulation bear
uncanny resemblance to those that underlie tax policy.
Moreover, many delegations of regulatory authority, whether intended
to by Congress or not, have been wielded in ways that can have massive
distributional consequences. Take, for example, the decision by the EPA to
designate carbon dioxide (and several other heat-trapping gases) as pollutants under the Clean Air Act.111 That decision, coupled with the agency’s
proposed rules to cut emissions from existing coal plants by as much as 30
percent by 2030, could obviously have significant distributional consequences.112 EPA regulation of greenhouse gases influences the prices of cars,
trucks, and energy, thereby changing the profitability of affected industries
and real wages in the economy.113
108. This is an argument we have heard from commenters who have read prior drafts of
this Article. Indeed, this point has been made at every workshop at which we have presented
this paper. However, we have found no written version of the argument, perhaps because no
one has seriously considered the possibility of delegating the power to set income tax rates
before.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2012) (“Congress . . . authoriz[es] the Secretary of Labor to
set mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce . . . .”).
110. For example, the Federal Communications Commission routinely permitted AT&T
to charge above-cost rates on interstate telephone service to cross-subsidize universal local
phone service at rates that were affordable to less affluent consumers. See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for U.S. Telecommunications
Policy, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 55, 59–60 (2007).
111. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Path to Regulate Heat-Trapping Gases for First Time in
the U.S., N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 2009, at A15, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/science/
earth/18endanger.html. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld these rules. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
112. See Amy Harder, EPA Sets Draft Rule to Cut Carbon Emissions by 30% by 2030, Wall
St. J. (June 2, 2014, 4:35 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/epa-rule-to-cost-up-to-8-8-billion-annually-sources-say-1401710600.
113. For a survey of the ways in which environmental regulation can have distributional
consequences, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787 (1993).
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All of which leaves unanswered, again, the central question: Why should
the regulatory approach to tax policy differ from regulatory approaches to
other areas of federal policy? One possible explanation is a combination of
historical accident and path dependence. The modern U.S. income tax was
introduced in 1913 following adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment earlier
that year, which gave Congress the authority to levy a federal income tax.114
After passing the initial tax legislation, Congress enacted several additional
tax statutes in succession, largely to provide funding during the First World
War (beginning in 1916 and continuing for several years thereafter); and it
was during this period that Congress developed the pattern of having legislative committees draft detailed revisions to various code sections.115 Also during this time, motivated by particular lawmakers who were pushing the
income tax as a source of federal war revenue, Congress began to cultivate
expertise in income tax statutory drafting in the “legislative drafting service,” created in 1918, which would later become the House and Senate Legislative Counsel offices (both still in existence today).116 At any point during
this period, of course, Congress might have decided to delegate additional
lawmaking authority to Treasury. However, Treasury, as well as Congress,
lacked prior experience with income tax laws generally, and the substantial
expansion in authority of federal regulatory agencies had yet to occur. Thus,
no large, well-staffed, and expert agency existed to which Congress could
have delegated the tax lawmaking task.117
Of course, historical accident and path dependency do not alone provide persuasive reasons why additional tax lawmaking authority—including
rate-setting authority—ought not be delegated to an agency today. Another
possible argument is that locating the power to set tax rates exclusively with
Congress and its committees is essential to the bargaining that characterizes
a successful legislative process. On this view, if Congress delegated control
over income tax rates to an agency, such a delegation would remove an issue
from the legislative process with respect to which legislators can bargain.
The absence of this bargaining chip would make it more difficult for Congress to reach tax and other legislative deals.118 For example, suppose that
conservative members of Congress would agree to raise tax rates only in
exchange for significant spending cuts, and liberals would concede on government spending reductions only in return for higher tax rates. In this
example, the only way to find common ground would be to bundle tax
114. E.g., George K. Yin, James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the “Greatest Tax Suit in the
History of the World,” and the Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff, 66 Tax
L. Rev. 787, 790 (2013).
115. Id. at 793, 808–13.
116. George K. Yin, Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev.
2287, 2295 (2013).
117. See id.
118. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting, 82 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1162 (1992).
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increases with spending cuts.119 If, however, Congress gave the Fed or Treasury authority over tax rates, liberal legislators might face less political pressure to agree to spending cuts.
The effect of delegation on congressional bargaining reflects the more
general impact of delegation on the distribution of power within Congress.
The member of Congress who has the ability to dispense favors (and disfavors) to taxpayers also has the ability to help other legislators by assisting
their constituents or by sharing campaign funds raised from those who seek
favors.120 A member of a congressional tax writing committee who votes to
reduce the committee’s authority by empowering the IRS or another agency
thereby votes to reduce the value of his or her hard-won committee seat,
making it perhaps unsurprising that this does not happen as a matter of
course.121
The potential effect of delegation on logrolling, however, is hardly
unique to tax policies. Yet in other areas Congress has nevertheless agreed to
delegate enormous lawmaking power to agencies, including power over decisions with large distributional consequences. For example, delegating to the
EPA the power to determine what constitutes a pollutant removes that chip
from the congressional bargaining table.122 So it is difficult to see why tax
policy is exceptional in this regard. Furthermore, even if this consideration is
important, it follows only that Congress should not irreversibly delegate all
of its power to change tax rates, which it is unable constitutionally to do in
any case. Just as Congress can always enact a law to rein in the EPA if it goes
too far in defining a pollutant, Congress could pass a law undoing any rate
change Treasury enacted that went too far. These political arguments do not
imply that Congress is unable to usefully delegate at least some of its discretion over tax rate setting. Rather, they suggest that Congress might want to
delegate only some of its control over rates.123
119. For example, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388, addressed growing federal budget deficits by increasing individual income tax
rates and federal excise tax rates, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 established the
“pay-as-you-go” rules that limited subsequent discretionary spending to measures paid for
with new taxes or other spending cuts. Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388-573
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 and 15 U.S.C.).
120. See, for example, the discussion of congressional favors surrounding passage of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 in Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci
Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform (1987).
121. For examples of tax legislation detail that Congress designed to promote the importance of tax writing committee members, see Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1159 (2006).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2012).
123. Courts can help police the boundary between the rate-setting power Congress delegates to Treasury and the rate-setting power it retains for itself. Treasury would be required by
principles of administrative law not to act beyond the congressional grant of rate-setting authority. Taxpayers affected by whatever rate increases Treasury adopts would have standing to
sue, challenging those increases for exceeding the scope of Congress’s delegation. Courts
would, however, presumably accord Chevron deference to Treasury rate-setting decisions, just
as they apply such deference to other agency decisions. For general discussion of the use of
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There are several reasons why it might be normatively attractive for
Congress to delegate control over tax rates. The first echoes the arguments
for congressional delegation of broad authority to agencies in general and to
Treasury in particular. Congress already delegates considerable authority to
the Treasury Department to interpret code sections and to enforce tax
laws.124 These delegations presumably reflect a congressional determination
that Treasury and the IRS have comparative advantages, in terms of expertise
and time, with respect to these aspects of tax law. The question this Section
poses is why the same point does not apply to tax rates. Assuming that Congress delegates regulatory authority to the Treasury with the expectation that
Treasury will deploy its expertise to craft sensible regulations that are consistent with congressional intent, Congress might want to permit the Treasury
to also modify tax rates with similar results. Second, tax bases and tax rates
together determine tax obligations; therefore, regulatory changes to tax base
definitions, which the Treasury routinely undertakes, automatically carry
implications for the distribution of tax burdens. Socially optimal tax policymaking might call for Congress to grant Treasury the power both to adjust
tax bases and to alter tax rates together. Indeed, if Treasury seeks to adjust
the tax base, having the ability to also make rate adjustments to achieve
distributional neutrality might be extraordinarily useful.
A third reason why Congress might want to delegate tax rate authority
to the Treasury or another agency is to afford greater tax policy flexibility in
response to changing economic and financial conditions. An agency that
concentrates on economic policy is better positioned than Congress to react
quickly and adroitly to economic developments. Since Congress has responsibility for all federal policies, it has less of a specialist focus. Furthermore,
Congress is political, a characteristic which need not be problematic in economic policymaking but can be; and worse, market anticipation of political
moves by Congress can undermine the effectiveness of economic policies.
An argument can be made that the Treasury Department, being answerable to the President, would be more responsive than Congress to changes in
circumstances that affect the majority of Americans, because the President
answers to a majority of the electorate in a way that no single legislator or
even group of legislators does.125 If this is true, it would mean that Treasury
might be better than Congress itself at responding to such changes in circumstances. Such responsiveness is, however, a liability in settings in which
effective policy requires committing to a consistent plan over time.126 In that
case, and for that reason, the Federal Reserve would likely be a better locus
administrative law to constrain agency discretion, see, for example, Bressman, supra note 16;
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 303 (1999).
124. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012).
125. Calabresi, supra note 56, at 59. Of course there is considerable disagreement over the
costs and benefits of a powerful unitary executive.
126. Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 473 (1977).
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for delegated tax rate-setting authority than Treasury. The customary rationale for central bank independence is indeed to reduce political influence
over monetary policy and thereby reassure financial markets of the credibility of long-run monetary policy: specifically, to commit governments not to
run large budget deficits that they then monetize, causing inflation and implicitly taxing holders of government bonds.127 An independent monetary
authority such as the Federal Reserve is instead charged with maintaining
steady long-run monetary stability while using policy mechanisms to reduce
the amplitude of economic cycles. Likewise, it would be natural to delegate
some countercyclical tax policy tools to the Federal Reserve, permitting it,
say, to adjust tax rates within a band (set statutorily by Congress) in response to short- and medium-run economic fluctuations. Indeed, there is
some research suggesting that, if countercyclical fiscal policy is to be used,
the optimal approach is to coordinate monetary and fiscal stimulus, which
may be easier to do if one body has both powers.128
Another objection to delegating control over tax rate-setting to the Treasury Department in particular is that such a delegation gives too much control over fiscal policy to one branch of government. The Treasury
Department ultimately answers to the President, who appoints the Secretary
of the Treasury as well as many other high-ranking Treasury officials.129 Presidential appointees might be tempted to make tax rate changes that benefit
the President’s political future and that of his or her political party. For
example, they might want to cut tax rates to boost the economy in the period leading up to an election, or to exercise the power to set tax rates in a
way that maximizes the advantage to the President’s election base or swing
voters in the next election.130 But the same criticism could be leveled in other
127. For a survey of the literature and evidence of the effectiveness of central bank independence, see Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, The Evolution of Central Bank Governance
Around the World, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 69 (2007).
128. For evidence of the effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy, see Alan J. Auerbach
et al., Activist Fiscal Policy, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 141 (2010). For analysis of the benefits of
coordinating monetary and fiscal policy, see Klaus Adam & Roberto M. Billi, Distortionary
Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy Goals, 122 Econ. Letters 1 (2014); Klaus Adam & Roberto
M. Billi, Monetary Conservatism and Fiscal Policy, 55 J. Monetary Econ. 1376 (2008); Jess
Benhabib & Stefano Eusepi, The Design of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Global Perspective, 123
J. Econ. Theory 40 (2005); William A. Branch et al., Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions Under
Implementable Monetary Policy Rules, 40 J. Money Credit & Banking 1095 (2008); Jagjit S.
Chadha & Charles Nolan, Optimal Simple Rules for the Conduct of Monetary and Fiscal Policy,
29 J. Macroeconomics 665 (2007); Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1522 (2003); Mats
Persson et al., Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution, 74 Econometrica
193 (2006); Diana N. Weymark, Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank
Independence, 51 Eur. Econ. Rev. 297 (2007); Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, Stabilizing
Expectations Under Monetary and Fiscal Policy Coordination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14391, 2008).
129. 31 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
130. These political considerations are distinct from the precommitment and time-inconsistency problems already mentioned. Here the argument is not that the executive branch—
seeking only to maximize social welfare—will find it difficult to maintain a time consistent
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areas of regulatory policy. For example, one could imagine political manipulation of environmental regulations—to favor certain consumers, or certain
industries—around the timing of sensitive elections. Yet either this happens
very little or else its occurrence has not prompted alarm sufficient for Congress to withdraw environmental regulatory authority. Moreover, concern
over excessive presidential influence over rate setting could in theory be dealt
with by delegating only a limited amount of rate setting power, requiring
that the Treasury coordinate its actions with the Congressional Budget Office, or else the use of an independent agency or commission styled on the
Federal Reserve—or possibly just giving this authority to the Federal Reserve, which could exercise it along with its power over the money supply.
A fourth, and related, reason to delegate tax rate authority is to avoid
congressional determination of tax policy features that Congress is unwilling
or unable to undertake. Congress might, for example, pass a law requiring
the Treasury or the Fed to select tax rates and bases that raise a given
amount of tax revenue in a manner consistent with broad income tax
progressivity and that distribute the burden fairly. Alternatively, Congress
could exercise greater control over the delegation by prescribing a distributional table (perhaps the status quo distribution that exists at the time of
enactment), leaving Treasury or the Fed to determine the rates that best
achieve that result, subject perhaps to congressional override by joint resolution majority vote of both houses. Insofar as fiscal stimulus concerns drive
tax rate changes, Congress could delegate the power to temporarily lower
marginal rates, within set boundaries. For example, current individual income tax rates are 10, 15, 25, 28, 33, 36, and 39.6 percent.131 Congress could
enact a law permitting Treasury or the Federal Reserve, upon determining
that a tax rate reduction is necessary for the economy, to reduce all rate
brackets by up to 10 percent of their prior levels for six to eighteen months,
which would have immediate effect unless Congress passes a joint resolution
reversing the rate change. Furthermore, the President answers to a larger
fraction of the voting population than does any member of Congress and is
arguably more responsive to the needs of the majority of the population.132
Another alternative to delegating tax rate-setting power to the Federal
Reserve, and the fiscal stimulus that it provides, would be to “delegate” that
power to a formula.133 That is, Congress could enact a statute providing that,
in the event that unemployment rises above a given threshold (say, 7.5 percent or some other point at which fiscal stimulus is generally deemed appropriate), individual income tax rates, corporate tax rates, or employment tax
rates, or perhaps all three, would be reduced by some set percentage that
Congress deems sufficient to put the economy back on track. And there
policy plan, but rather that the executive on occasion may have an incentive to use the office of
the Treasury for purely partisan political purposes.
131. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296).
132. See Calabresi, supra note 56, at 59.
133. Delegation to a formula that is written by Congress and by congressional committees
is of course a form of nondelegation.
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could be a symmetrical automatic rate increase when unemployment falls
below the same or another threshold. One advantage of such an approach
would be an even greater degree of separation between the power to set rates
and the political process; indeed, there would be complete separation, except
that Congress would obviously retain the power to alter the rate-change
formula by enacting a new statute. The obvious, and quite serious, difficulty
with such automatic rate changes is the difficulty Congress would face in
deciding on the optimal rate-change formula and triggering thresholds. Indeed, it seems likely that the optimal formula and threshold would vary
depending on circumstances in the economy, suggesting that the better approach would be to delegate at least some discretion to the Fed. Indeed, that
is precisely what has been done with the money supply, as the Fed has considerable power to alter the discount rate, and to purchase assets, as circumstances require.
C. Delegating Tax Reform
Many have described the need for tax reform as a problem analogous to
the base-closing problem: everyone in theory wants it to happen, but no one
wants to vote for anything that imposes burdens on their constituents or on
the individuals and groups that contribute to their reelection.134 With the
base-closing situation, virtually everyone agreed not only that spending on
national defense should be dramatically reduced, but also that this reduction, (1) should include the closure of a substantial number of domestically
located military bases, and (2) that the choice as to which bases should be
closed ought to turn on the merits, as determined by military experts, and
not by politics or logrolling among members of Congress.135 The Base Closure and Realignment Commission offered an appealing solution to the
problem. Even though each legislator could potentially lose from the decision of the base-closure process, as a group they agreed to the process—in
part because it was the right thing to do, and in part because they could
deflect responsibility if the commission selected their hometown base for
closure.136 Of course, they could be blamed for voting in favor of the process,
but most legislators apparently did not find the risk of being saddled with
that sort of responsibility sufficient to prevent them from doing what made
sense as a policy matter.
A similar story might be told for tax reform. Many lawmakers feel that
the IRC is broken: that it is too long, too complex, and littered with provisions that make little sense now, if they ever did.137 Moreover, many believe
that the country would be better off if Congress simplified or eliminated
134. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 36, at 394, 396.
135. See id. at 398–402.
136. Id. at 396–97, 405.
137. For one of many examples, see Congressman Tim Huelskamp, Tax Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives, http://huelskamp.house.gov/issues/tax-reform (last visited May
12, 2015) (“Already more than 1,000,000 words long, the U.S. tax code is too long, complicated and burden[s] real job growth.”).
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some of these. In addition, one need not oppose tax credits, deductions, and
exemptions as a general matter to support tax reform; even tax expenditure
enthusiasts would likely agree that some overall pruning makes sense. As a
result, Congress could vote for a process authorizing a group of experts,
perhaps in the executive branch, perhaps in an independent body, to produce a tax reform plan that would, subject to approval by the President,
become law unless stopped by a joint resolution of a majority of both houses
of Congress. To the extent that general agreement exists concerning the need
for reductions in tax expenditures, the advantages of such an approach are
similar to the advantages of the base-closure legislation. First, if any particular tax provision is popular with a politically powerful constituency, this
approach enables legislators to vote for a process that can lead to beneficial
tax reform, even though that reform may result in the elimination of that
provision. Second, the proposal helps circumvent the Senate filibuster as an
obstacle to reform. By requiring a simple joint majority vote to stop the
reform proposal submitted by the independent commission and approved
by the President, a minority of senators could not block reform by threatening a filibuster.138 It could happen.
Of course, it has not happened. There have been many U.S. tax reform
efforts, even tax reform commissions, with extensive reports and nothing
legislatively to show for the effort. This may be due in part to the absence of
a shared national consensus on the desirability of tax reform, but also due to
the reluctance of legislators to enact new tax laws that heavily burden certain
groups. Three recent examples are illustrative of these efforts.
President Bush empaneled the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform in January 2005, which issued its report in November 2005.139
Charged with recommending tax options to make the U.S. tax system simpler, fairer, and more conducive to economic growth, this bipartisan commission included political and academic tax experts and an outstanding
staff.140 The commission developed two promising blueprints for major federal tax reform for the Treasury Department to evaluate, possibly amend,
and selectively recommend to Congress.141 Unfortunately, the political winds

138. Senate filibusters are permitted by Senate Rule XIX, and cloture is invoked by Senate
Rule XXII. See Richard S. Beth & Valerie Heitshusen, Cong. Research Serv., Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate (2014). Of course, the sixty-vote cloture rule would have to
be satisfied to pass the bill delegating such tax reform authority to an independent commission in the first place. But the hope, as in the base-closure case, is that it would be easier to get
sixty votes for such delegation, as it would have the benefit of deflecting responsibility for the
ultimate legislative reform.
139. Connie Mack, III et al., President’s Advisory Panel on Fed. Tax Reform, Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System (2005). The full-time
and part-time staff who participated in the work of the panel, as well as the panel itself,
includes some of the most well-respected public finance economists and tax law experts in the
country.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 59.
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shifted and the Treasury Department never forwarded any version of either
recommendation.
In 2010, Congress considered legislation to create a Bipartisan Task
Force for Responsible Fiscal Action that would recommend policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and achieve fiscal stability over
the long run, with the commission’s recommendations subject without
amendment to up-or-down congressional votes.142 The Senate defeated this
proposal,143 after which President Obama nonetheless created the commission (known informally as the Bowles-Simpson Commission, after its cochairs), and gave it the membership and charge it would have had under the
failed legislation, but without any special status for its recommendations.144
The commission passed a December 2010 report over considerable internal
dissent, and Congress never brought its recommendations to a vote.145
Finally, as part of a political deal to raise the federal debt ceiling and
thereby avoid defaulting on the debt, the Budget Control Act of 2011 created
the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (informally known as the
Supercommittee146), a bipartisan joint committee of Congress charged with
developing a plan to reduce federal deficits by $1.5 trillion over ten years.147
The committee’s recommendations were to be subject without amendment
to up-or-down congressional votes; in the absence of committee recommendations and successful passage by Congress by December 23, 2010, the bill
authorized an automatic $1.2 trillion in spending cuts over ten years.148 In
the end, the committee failed to reach agreement, no recommendations were
forthcoming, and the automatic spending cuts took effect.149
One could imagine Congress more forcefully passing legislation empowering a commission to propose tax legislation that would automatically become law in the absence of specified congressional intervention, a design
similar to that of the base-closing commission. Congress could instruct the
commission to raise a specified amount of revenue, or revenue equal to a
142. 156 Cong. Rec. 585–88 (2010).
143. Id. at 639.
144. Exec. Order No. 13,531, 75 Fed. Reg. 7927 (Feb. 18, 2010).
145. Nat’l Comm’n on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth:
Report of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (2010),
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf; Jackie Calmes, Fiscal Plan is Expected to Fall Short of Votes, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 2010, at A22, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/us/politics/03fiscal.html?_r=0; In a
11-7 Tally, the Fiscal Commission Falls Short on Votes, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/03/us/politics/deficit-commission-vote.html?_r=0.
146. See, e.g., Editorial, The Supercommittee Collapses, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2011, at A28,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/opinion/the-deficit-supercommittee-collapses
.html?_r=0.
147. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 401(b), 125 Stat. 240, 259–62.
148. Id. at §§ 301(a)(2), 402, 125 Stat. 240, 252, 263–65.
149. Binyamin Appelbaum & Annie Lowrey, For Deficit Panel, Failure Cuts Two Ways, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 22, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/us/politics/behind-deficitpanels-failure-a-surprise.html.
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specified fraction of national income, with its tax plan. Congress could then
identify the tax burden distribution (as a function of income, age, geography, or other variables) that it wishes the tax plan to impose. This would be
a very strong form of delegation that might permit Congress to achieve goals
that it has so far found elusive.
One of the benefits—and at times, the cost—of delegation is the commitment that it affords. In removing itself from the final stages of the tax
rate and tax base determination process, Congress would partially insulate
itself from the pleadings of lobbyists interested in maintaining favorable
treatment for special interests. Voting in favor of delegation might incense
lobbyists as a group, but a member of Congress could offer a principled
reason for such an affirmative vote, even while expressing sympathy to individual lobbyists for the cause he or she champions. There is no doubt that
the locus of lobbying efforts in such a scenario would then turn more toward the Treasury, independent commission, or Federal Reserve—whatever
entity Congress empowers with greater tax lawmaking authority—and there
would be attendant complications as these organizations inevitably become
somewhat more political in response. While the less political nature of the
delegated authority might well reduce the problems associated with lobbying, these problems will not disappear, and it is naı̈ve to think that an agency
with newly granted authority over policies of great interest to lobbyists could
maintain its prior level of independence entirely unchanged. On the other
hand, one of the related benefits of greater tax delegation to the Treasury
and Federal Reserve is that the greater authority vested in these organizations would very likely make it easier for them to attract and retain highly
qualified and professional staff.
The commitment associated with delegation has the most potential
value in circumstances in which the absence of commitment is most problematic. Long-run fiscal imbalance is arguably the primary tax and spending
problem subject to commitment problems, dwarfing (and at time coinciding
with) the problems associated with lobbying and special interests.150 Longrun challenges, such as structural fiscal deficits and long-run environmental
degradation, are paradigmatic cases of collective action problems, because
many of the affected parties are unborn and therefore unable to bargain.151
Congress and other legislatures are notoriously willing to forego policy sustainability for short-term advantages. One possibility would be for Congress
to empanel a commission with the authority—subject to some form of congressional override—to enact tax and spending policies that bring the country’s accounts into long-run fiscal balance. In a nod to reality, such a

150. For a reasoned survey of the data on the long-run fiscal imbalance, see The Coming
Crisis: America’s Dangerous Debt: Hearing Before the S. Budget Comm., 114th Cong. (2015),
http://www.budget.senate.gov/republican/public/index.cfm/2015/2/the-coming-crisis-americas-dangerous-debt (statement of Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Professor of Economics, Boston
University).
151. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (2d ed. 1971).
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commission’s actions might have binding force starting several election cycles from the enactment date. In the absence of truly binding constraints, it
is admittedly uncertain just what impact the commission’s output would
have—though the general unwillingness of Congress to tamper excessively
with existing regulations offers a glimmer of hope that policy commitments,
even if not fully binding, can have important and beneficial effects on policy
outcomes.
IV. The Constitutionality of Expanded Tax Delegation
Expanded tax delegation must be constitutional in order to be feasible,
and while it has not been directly tested before the Supreme Court, there are
strong reasons to expect that the Court would uphold its constitutionality.
The main argument is that the so-called nondelegation doctrine, the most
likely constitutional ground on which expanded tax delegations might be
challenged, is dead; or at least the nondelegation doctrine is so weak that it
no longer matters.152 According to this argument, the Constitution actually
places very few limits on the types of authority Congress can delegate to an
agency or commission, and the limits that remain are easily satisfied.153 The
interesting question is whether the same statement applies to delegations of
tax law, given that the Constitution expressly mentions taxation as one of
the powers granted to Congress. And the Court has occasionally suggested
that tax is different, as evidenced by Justice Douglas’s line in the National
Cable Television Association case quoted at the start of this Article.154 Nevertheless, the conventional wisdom seems to be that Congress has just as much
freedom to delegate tax lawmaking power as it has to delegate any sort of
lawmaking power.
The nondelegation doctrine is said to arise from Article I of the Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.”155 The doctrine holds that, for a statutory delegation of lawmaking power to be constitutional, Congress must supply an “intelligible principle” to guide the lawmaking decisions of the agency or
commission or other actor to whom such power has been delegated.156 An
intelligible principle constrains agency discretion and provides a standard by
which courts can review agency decisionmaking. The Supreme Court, however, has only applied the nondelegation doctrine to strike down statutory
delegations of lawmaking power by Congress twice, and both times were in
152. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
153. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
154. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1973) (“Taxation is a
legislative function, and Congress . . . is the sole organ for levying taxes . . . .”).
155. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
156. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2000) (citing J. W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); Sunstein, supra note 123, at 330–35
(discussing the development of the doctrine over time).
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the 1930s.157 As a result, constitutional scholars and Supreme Court Justices
alike seem to agree that the doctrine no longer has any bite.158
Scholars offer several rationales to justify the disappearance of the
nondelegation doctrine as a constraint on Congress’s power to delegate.
Some of these rationales track the justifications for delegation reviewed in
Part II: agencies’ relative expertise, flexibility, and distance from the political
process as compared with Congress.159 Another commonly cited reason why
the Court has been reluctant to use the Constitution to strike down congressional delegations of authority is that the Court does not want the job of
policing the line between what is delegable and what is not delegable.160
Rather, this is the sort of political question that the Court prefers to leave to
elected members of government.161 In addition, to the extent a vigorous
nondelegation doctrine would be motivated by a desire to make sure that
Congress is held accountable for the laws promulgated under its authority,
such accountability remains. Even without a nondelegation doctrine to impose constitutional limits, federal agencies cannot make law without first
receiving some congressional authorization that could always be legislatively
revoked.162 Moreover, scholars have pointed out that, even though the Constitution does little to limit congressional delegation (other than imposing
157. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
158. Many have pronounced the doctrine either “moribund” or “dead.” See, e.g., Fed.
Power Comm’n v. New Eng. Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring
in the result) (“The notion that the Constitution narrowly confines the power of Congress to
delegate authority to administrative agencies, which was briefly in vogue in the 1930’s, has
been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical purposes . . . .”); John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 132–33 (1980); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 16, at 1722 (“In our view there just is no constitutional nondelegation
rule, nor has there ever been.”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 16 (arguing that the nondelegation
doctrine is not dead, but is instead relocated to other doctrines). But some scholars argue that
the doctrine should be brought back to life. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327 (2002).
159. Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 22; Schuck, supra note 22.
160. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 22, at 793.
161. The Supreme Court has long declined to hear certain types of disputes that it believes
present “political questions” that the Constitution leaves to the other branches of government.
See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208–10 (1962).
162. An interesting argument is that under certain conditions the President has the power
to alter tax laws, including raising tax rates, even in the absence of authorizing congressional
legislation. The argument, advanced by Neil Buchanan and Michael Dorf, applies when the
President is put in a situation in which there is no constitutional alternative; that is, because of
the nature of the circumstances, all of the President’s options are arguably contrary to the
Constitution. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L.
Rev. 1175 (2012). In such a situation, they argue, the “most constitutional” thing for the
President to do is to choose the “least unconstitutional course.” Id. at 1175. The specific example they discuss involves the following “trilemma” that faced President Obama in 2011 and
may well face him or his successors again (and again). When the amount of federal borrowing
necessary to pay the country’s outstanding spending obligations, which are the product of a
duly enacted federal statute, approaches the limit imposed by the so-called debt ceiling, also
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the “intelligible principle” requirement), other interpretive tools are available to the courts to limit agency discretion. Some scholars, for example,
argue that the function once played by the doctrine has been relocated elsewhere, especially to various interpretive doctrines.163 Given all of these reasons, the demise of nondelegation as a freestanding limit on Congress’s
power to delegate seems wholly unexceptional.
But what about nondelegation as applied to tax law? A serious argument
can be made that, even if the Constitution generally places few limits on the
power of Congress to delegate, there are several reasons why tax law should
be treated differently.164 First, in the political and social history of the country’s founding period, leading up to and including the drafting of the Constitution, taxes played a uniquely pivotal role. Resentment of British taxes
encouraged the American Revolution; subsequently, the difficulty of securing sufficient financing of both the revolutionary efforts and the early U.S.
government strengthened the case for a strong federal government with significant taxing authority.165 Second, the Constitution itself expressly assigned
the taxing power to Congress. Specifically, Article I, Section 8, provides that
“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes.”166 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has long held, and recently reaffirmed, that Congress’s power to tax is
broader than its power to regulate.167
Third, not only does the Constitution specifically assign the taxing
power to Congress, it goes so far as to specify how tax laws must be enacted.
Article I, Section 7 expressly states that “[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives.”168 It could be argued that locating the power to initiate tax legislation in the House forecloses the option for
the product of a duly enacted federal statute, the President must either “ignore the debt ceiling
and unilaterally issue new bonds, thus usurping Congress’s borrowing power; unilaterally raise
taxes, thus usurping Congress’s taxing power; or unilaterally cut spending, thus usurping Congress’s spending power.” Id. Buchanan and Dorf favor first unilaterally raising the debt ceiling,
but, if that proves insufficient to calm the credit markets, then raising tax rates, with spending
cuts as the least preferred option. Id.
163. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399, 1408–15 (2000); Sunstein, supra note 16,
at 322, 328–30.
164. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 239, 243–47 (2005)
(arguing that nondelegation doctrine should have special force in the tax context).
165. See Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States (Augustus M.
Kelley 1968) (12th ed. 1934); Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States:
The Meaning of the Founders’ Constitution (2005); 1 William Graham Sumner, The
Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution (Augustus M. Kelley 1968)
(1891).
166. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
167. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (holding that, although the
Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the authority to require individuals to
purchase health insurance, the taxing clause does provide Congress with the power to tax
people for not buying health insurance); id. at 2600 (“[T]he breadth of Congress’s power to
tax is greater than its power to regulate . . . .”).
168. U.S. Const. art I, § 7.
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agencies to be the source of tax policy. Finally, as mentioned earlier, many
consider tax and spending legislation the primary tool by which society implements its distributional, or redistributive, goals. Indeed, there are those
who argue that, if society wants to redistribute from the rich to the poor, the
most efficient means of doing so is the tax and spending system, rather than,
for example, redistributive legal rules.169 On the basis of these reasons, one
might argue that Congress’s ability to delegate tax lawmaking power should
be more limited than its power to delegate other types of regulatory
authority.
The argument, however, faces the difficulty that its conclusions do not
follow from its premises. Even if taxes did play an important, even a central,
role in the founding of the country and in the drafting of the Constitution,
that fact does not necessarily imply anything about Congress’s power to
delegate the taxing power. More specifically, that tax law was uniquely important during the country’s founding does not imply that delegation of
authority by Congress should be more (or less) difficult in the tax area than
in other areas. Likewise, that the Constitution expressly locates the federal
taxing power within Congress, and specifically requires that revenue bills
originate in the House of Representatives, imposes no obvious limit on Congress’s power to delegate its tax lawmaking authority, so long as the delegation is explicit and takes the form of a statute that originates in the House. If
Congress retains the power to alter or claw back whatever version of the
taxing power it delegates (which would always be the case with any plausible
form of tax delegation—and certainly with the version of tax delegation that
we have proposed), then Congress has effectively retained the power to
tax.170 Moreover, as we have discussed above, even if there is a consensus that
distributional objectives should be set by congressional statute, Congress can
legislatively require that any delegated tax lawmaking be crafted to achieve
particular distributional outcomes. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, no Supreme Court case has ever struck down a congressional delegation of tax lawmaking authority on nondelegation grounds, and no case has
held that the limits on tax delegation are any different than the limits on
other types of delegation—which, by general agreement, are trivial.171 Thus,
so long as Congress articulates an intelligible principle in authorizing legislation (that originates in the House), all of the expanded forms of tax delegation discussed in this Article should pass constitutional muster.172
169. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667 (1994).
170. This argument parallels arguments made generally against a strong nondelegation
doctrine.
171. There have been only a handful of cases in which any sort of law was struck down on
nondelegation grounds. See Sunstein, supra note 16. None of those cases involved delegation of
tax lawmaking authority.
172. The Court’s recent decision in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), is not to the
contrary. In that case the Court held, among other things, that Congress did not intend to
delegate to the IRS the power to decide whether federal tax credits for purchasing health
insurance would be available on federal health insurance exchanges as well as state exchanges
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This conclusion is, however, subject to a few caveats. First, it is notoriously difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will decide a particular
case. Second, to the extent that Congress was to make radical departures
from prior delegations in the tax area, it is conceivable that the Court could
be provoked to announce a new distinction between tax delegations and
other regulatory delegations, imposing greater limits on the former. This
possibility seems more likely for the types of expanded tax delegation that
are most unlike prior tax delegations. In other words, delegating more of a
role in designing tax subsidy provisions to Treasury seems unlikely to be
enough of a departure from what Congress has done in the past, when it has
delegated the job of defining the tax base, to concern the Court, even one
that wanted to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. Delegating control
over individual or corporate rates to Treasury or to the Federal Reserve,
however, or delegating tax reform to a commission, would be a departure
from anything that has been done in the tax area before—although, again,
the base closure case would provide one helpful and relevant precedent (albeit not in the tax area).
In the extreme, if Congress passed a law repealing the entire IRC and
replacing it with a single sentence giving Treasury power to create a new
income tax system that is “fair and efficient and that collects revenue sufficient to balance the budget,” one wonders if the Court might not take that
as the occasion to revisit the limits of the “intelligible principle” idea. In
addition, if Congress does decide to delegate tax law in a more expansive
way, the Court has made clear that some ways of doing so are not acceptable, although not necessarily on classic nondelegation grounds. For example, after the Court’s decision in Clinton v. City of New York, congressional
delegation of authority by granting the President the power to cancel or
invalidate particular types of laws (including tax laws) is off the table, because, according to the Court, doing so violates the Presentment Clause.173
None of the expanded tax delegations discussed above, however, have this
structure.174
or whether, instead, they would be available only on the latter. In the Court’s words, “[i]t is
especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no
expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.” Id. at 2489. This statement does not
suggest that Congress lacks the authority, under the taxing power, to delegate such decisions to
the IRS if it chooses to, only that it must do so expressly and not by silent implication. See id.
173. 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding, among other things, that the Line-Item Veto statute,
which empowered the President to strike certain types duly enacted of laws from a statute
without approval of Congress, violated Article 1, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution); see also
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
174. Although the majority’s opinion in Clinton is put in terms of concerns about compliance with the Presentment Clause, a number of commentators have pointed out that the real,
albeit largely unstated, concern is with excessive delegation or with delegation of a particular
sort. And the particular type of delegation that the Court seems to find problematic is delegation of the power to “unmake” law rather delegation of the power to make law. See, e.g.,
Barron & Rakoff, supra note 1, at 314. None of the delegations analyzed in this Article are of
the power to unmake existing law.
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Conclusion
Congress delegates broad regulatory authority to federal agencies or independent commissions in many important areas of federal policy. Environmental law is one obvious example, in which the EPA has been delegated
enormous authority to promulgate substantive rules that can have enormous
effects on incentives and distribution. Federal tax law is done differently.
More so than in other areas of law, all of the big decisions—rate setting and
definitions of the tax base—are made by Congress itself, or, more specifically, are delegated pre-enactment to the tax-writing committees. There are
certain exceptions such as with § 482 and § 1502, but as a general matter
Congress delegates relatively little tax lawmaking power. Since all of the arguments that support broad delegation in other areas apply to the tax context as well, Congress should at least consider doing more broad tax
delegation.
Broad delegation of taxing power is not without precedent. Other governments sometimes grant relatively broad policymaking discretion to their
tax enforcement agencies. In Ireland, for example, the legislature enacted a
general anti-avoidance provision (known as “section 811”) that delegates the
power to determine when tax avoidance has occurred to the Irish Revenue
Commissioners, permitting them in so doing to disregard legislatively enacted tax statutes.175 This statutory provision goes well beyond anything enacted in the United States; it offers the benefit of enhancing revenue
collections at the cost of possibly introducing uncertainty and arbitrariness
in the enforcement process. However, even that example of tax delegation
focuses primarily on issues of enforcement and anti-avoidance. Perhaps a
better example of the sort of delegation considered in this Article is the law
passed by the California legislature in 2006 (known as “Assembly Bill 32”)
requiring the California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources
Board to design and implement a market-based system to reduce California’s greenhouse gas emissions. This grant of tax policymaking authority
took effect in 2011 when the California environmental regulator adopted
regulations that took the form of a cap-and-trade system roughly equivalent
to carbon taxes.176
175. See Paul Brady, General Anti-Avoidance: Time for a Re-Think?, Irish Tax Rev., July
2008, at 64, 65, http://www.taxandlegal.ie/ITRJuly2008.pdf (“[Section 811] delegates the power
to determine when tax avoidance has occurred to the Revenue Commissioners and permits
them to disregard tax provisions enacted by the [Irish legislature].”).
176. New Zealand formally delegates a significant part of the responsibility for proposing
and designing new tax legislation to civil servants in its Inland Revenue Department. See
Struan Little et al., Development of Tax Policy in New Zealand: The Generic Tax
Policy Process 13 (2013), http://www.ctf.ca/CTFWEB/EN/Publications/Tax_Policy/Tax_Poli
cy_Roundtable_2013.aspx. And for many years Sweden has had a similar, albeit less formal,
system of tax policy development that relies on delegation of authority to tax professionals in
government. See Sven Steinmo, The Evolution of the Swedish Model, in Internalizing
Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of
Capitalism 149, 149–64 (Susanne Soederberg et al. eds., 2005).
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This Article entertains three particular versions of expanded tax delegation. First, Congress should consider general statutory grants to delegate
greater authority to the Treasury Department to design particular tax subsidy provisions, such as the R&E credit. Second, Congress should consider
delegating some control over income tax rates, either to Treasury, the Federal Reserve or perhaps a newly created independent authority, thereby facilitating the coordination of fiscal policy with monetary policy to minimize
the effects of business cycles, while also avoiding problems of time inconsistency. Finally, Congress should consider delegating the job of tax reform to
an independent commission with authority to enact tax law reforms that
would take effect unless a majority of both houses of Congress vote to stop
it. All of these expansions of tax lawmaking authority have analogs in other
areas of law and policy, where broad delegations of authority are common.
This Article considers the practice of broad delegation in nontax areas as
possible precedent for broader delegation in the tax area. The reverse argument could also be made: that instead of expanding tax delegation to mimic
other areas of federal policy, Congress should perhaps conform delegation
in other policy areas to mimic the way in which tax policy is currently made.
In other words, the inverse lesson would be that Congress could consider
wresting delegated authority from the nontax agencies and returning that
authority to Congress, and to congressional committees. Congress would
then be responsible for providing all of the important details of those nontax regulatory regimes, with the executive agencies primarily filling in the
gaps around the edges and, importantly, focusing on enforcement. Indeed,
there are those in Congress who would take precisely that approach.177 This
is not the path that Congress has taken in areas other than tax law; and while
it is not necessary that the policy process work similarly in all areas of law, it
is difficult to identify principles that support approaching tax law so differently. Perhaps there nonetheless exist real and important differences between
tax law and every other area of law that make tax delegation different from
every other type of delegation; and if so, it would be very useful to understand their implications and their limits.

177. Republican Members of Congress have recently proposed legislative steps to reverse
the trend toward expanded delegation of federal lawmaking authority to agencies, a trend that
they claim has accelerated under President Obama. Some of the proposals entail reduced funding or increased reporting requirements for executive agencies. See, e.g., Benjamin Goad, GOP
Bills Target ‘Overreaching’ EPA, The Hill (Feb. 14, 2013, 8:25 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/energy-environment/283257-gop-bills-target-epa-power-seek-transparency- (describing
legislative proposals to limit EPA “overreaching” put forward by Sen. Mike Johanns, Republican of Nebraska).

